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We present an evolutionary psychological perspective on social capital. We ﬁrst suggest
that evolutionary psychology provides the most ultimate (as opposed to proximate) theo-
retical deﬁnition and most theoretically driven measures of social capital, by providing a
theory of values and specifying what human actors value and want. We then suggest that
evolutionary psychology can illuminate certain cognitive constraints and biases to which
human actors are subject in their attempt to seek the most efﬁcient means to achieve their
ultimate goal of reproductive success. We illustrate the utility of an evolutionary psycho-
logical perspective on social capital with its application to some empirical puzzles: Why
women have more kin in their personal relationships than men do, and why we are closer
to our maternal grandmothers than to our paternal grandfathers.
 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
What is social capital? Capital is any resource that helps individuals produce or achieve some goal. Social capital inheres in
relationships between individuals, just as physical capital inheres in physical objects and human capital inheres in humans.
Thus social capital is any resource that inheres in relationships between individuals that helps them produce or achieve
some goal. But what are individuals’ goals? What do humans want?
Any resource can be capital depending upon the goal. If your goal is to run an efﬁcient drugs market in your neighborhood,
then guns and ammunition are important physical capital, the ability to distinguish between high-quality and low-quality
drugs is important human capital, and connections to corrupt cops in the precinct are important social capital. None of these
resourcesqualifyascapitalifyourgoalistoearnanMBAinHarvardBusinessSchool.Ifwedon’tknowwhatthegoalsofhuman
behaviorare,wedon’tknowwhatcapitalis(socialorotherwise).Andifwedon’tknowwhatitis,wecan’tmeasureitprecisely.
The problem of deﬁning social capital may therefore be largely a problem of values. We need a theory of values that ex-
plains what humans want in order to deﬁne what social capital is. Without it, any deﬁnition of social capital is likely to be ad
hoc. Unfortunately, however, while some have made promising starts (Hechter, Ranger-Moore, Jasso, & Horne, 1999;
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journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/joepSchwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Wildavsky, 1987), there is presently no general theory of values that is widely ac-
cepted (Hechter, 1992, 1994; Hechter, Nadel, & Michod, 1993). This is why nobody seems to know what exactly social capital
is, or different people deﬁne it differently (Paxton, 1999).
The lack of consensus on what social capital is has led researchers to deﬁne it in widely varied ways: participation in vol-
untary associations (Paxton, 1999, 2002; Putnam, 1995); voter turnout (Putnam, 1995); norm enforcement and social con-
trol (Coleman, 1988); trust (Coleman, 1988; Paxton, 1999, 2002); social network ties (Burt, 1998); family composition
(presence of two biological parents; Portes, 2000); and ‘‘embedded social resources” (resources one can access through net-
work ties; Lin, 2000). The lack of consensus has also led many empirical studies on social capital to contain sections called
‘‘Social Capital” or ‘‘What is Social Capital?” (Coleman, 1988, pp. S97–S100; McNeal, 1999, pp. 119–120; Paxton, 1999, pp.
91–97; Paxton, 2002, p. 256; Renzulli, Aldrich, & Moody, 2000, pp. 524–530; Schiff, 1992, pp. 159–161). Paxton (1999, p.
90) observes that ‘‘the term ‘‘social capital” is used in many recent articles but in vastly different ways.”
We do not seem to have as much trouble deﬁning physical or human capital as we do deﬁning social capital, because the
concepts of physical and human capital are often used in microeconomics and rational choice theory, where the human goals
are narrowly deﬁned economically (the maximization of individual utility, which practically often means wealth or income
maximization). In contrast, scholars who discuss social capital have a wider view of social life than how economists view
economic life, and do not always know what humans value in social life (even though they may know what humans value
in economic life). What makes clear deﬁnitions of physical and human capital possible is economists’ clear deﬁnition of hu-
man values in economic life.
Evolutionary psychology is currently a strong contender for a general theory of values (Ben-Ner & Putterman, 2000;
Horne, 2004; Kanazawa, 2001a). It is a general theoretical perspective that can explain the ultimate (as opposed to proxi-
mate) causes of human behavior, cognition, preferences and emotions. Evolutionary psychology can therefore theoretically
deﬁne human goals, and thus social (as well as physical and human) capital. Evolutionary psychology is compatible with a
variety of proximate theories of values and goals.
In this paper, we present an evolutionary psychological perspective on social capital. Our aim is twofold. First, we suggest
that evolutionary psychology provides the most ultimate (as opposed to proximate) theoretical deﬁnition and most theoret-
ically driven measures of social capital, by specifying what human actors value and want. Second, we suggest that evolution-
ary psychology can illuminate certain cognitive constraints and biases to which human actors are subject in their attempt to
seek the most efﬁcient means to achieve their ultimate goal of reproductive success. We then illustrate the utility of an evo-
lutionary psychological perspective on social capital with its application to one empirical puzzle: why women have more kin
in their social networks than men do.
2. Biases and constraints in how the mind works
2.1. The Savanna Principle
Evolutionary psychology rejects the view of the human mind as tabula rasa, and avers instead that it is content-rich and
biased. The human brain, and all of its psychological mechanisms, are adapted to the ancestral environment and are therefore
biased in favor of viewing and responding to the world as if it were still the ancestral environment. The psychological mech-
anisms we possess today are still the same psychological mechanisms that we possessed in the ancestral environment. It is
not impossible to overcome this bias through conscious effort, but it is often difﬁcult.
Phobias and fears provide a good example. Most humans have deep-seated fear of spiders and snakes, and they appear to
have an innate capacity for prepared learning for such fears (Öhman & Mineka, 2001). This is because spiders and snakes,
many species of which are poisonous, represented genuine threats to human survival in the ancestral environment (Nesse,
1990). That is why humans have biological mechanisms (either freezing or ﬂeeing) to deal with these threats. Humans have
been selected to have the evolved psychological mechanism to learn to fear spiders and snakes with a minimal environmen-
tal stimulus and the physical mechanisms to freeze or ﬂee to avoid the danger.
This is true even today. Even though very few of us, living in urban cities, encounter poisonous spiders and snakes, we still
have phobias for them. For most of us, cars and guns represent far greater danger for survival than spiders and snakes; about
50,000 people die in car accidents in the United States every year, whereas fewer than 20 people die from spider and snake
bites (nearly all of them owners of poisonous spiders and snakes) (Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006, p. 341). However, most of us
still have innate and strong fear of spiders and snakes, rather than cars and guns, because our brain is biased to perceive our
environment as if it were still the ancestral environment, where there were no cars and guns.
Pioneers of evolutionary psychology (Crawford, 1993; Symons, 1990; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990) all recognized that the
evolved psychological mechanisms are adapted to the conditions of the ancestral environment, not to those of the current
environment. Kanazawa (2004b) systematizes these observations into what he calls the Savanna Principle: The human brain
has difﬁculty comprehending and dealing with entities and situations that did not exist in the ancestral environment. Burnham
and Johnson (2005, pp. 130–131) refer to the same observation as the evolutionary legacy hypothesis, while Hagen and
Hammerstein (2006, pp. 341–343) call it the mismatch hypothesis.
The Savanna Principle can potentially explain why some otherwise elegant scientiﬁc theories of human behavior, such as
the subjective expected utility maximization theory or game theory, often fail empirically, because they posit entities and
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may make the theoretically irrational choice to cooperate with their partner, possibly because the human brain has difﬁculty
comprehending completely anonymous social exchange and absolutely no possibility of knowing future interactions (which
makes the game truly one-shot). Neither of these situations existed in the ancestral environment, but they are crucial for the
game-theoretical prediction of universal defection.
Fehr and Henrich (2003) suggest that one-shot encounters and exchanges might have been common in the ancestral envi-
ronment. In their response to Fehr and Henrich, Hagen and Hammerstein (2006) point out that, even if one-shot encounters
were common in the ancestral environment, anonymous encounters could not have been common, and the game-theoretic
prediction of defection in one-shot games requires both noniteration and anonymity. A lack of anonymity can lead to rep-
utational concerns even in nonrepeated exchanges.
As another illustration of the Savanna Principle, individuals who watch certain types of TV shows are more satisﬁed with
their friendships, just as they are if they had more friends or socialized with them more frequently (Kanazawa, 2002). This
may be because realistic images of other humans, such as television, movies, videos, and photographs, did not exist in the
ancestral environment, where all realistic images of other humans were other humans. As a result, the human brain may
have implicit difﬁculty distinguishing their ‘‘TV friends” (the characters they repeatedly see on TV shows) and their real
friends.
Most evolutionary psychologists and biologists concur that humans have not undergone signiﬁcant evolutionary changes
in the last 10,000 years, since the end of the Pleistocene Epoch, and this is the assumption behind the Savanna Principle.
More recently, however, some scientists have voiced opinions that human evolution has continued and even accelerated
during the Holocene Epoch (Cochran & Harpending, 2009; Evans et al., 2005). While these studies conclusively demonstrate
that new alleles have indeed emerged in the human genome since the end of the Pleistocene Epoch, the implication and
importance of such new alleles for evolutionary psychology are not immediately obvious. In particular, with the sole excep-
tion of lactose tolerance, it is not clear whether these new alleles have led to the emergence of new evolved psychological
mechanisms in the last 10,000 years.
While humans are quite ﬂexible and adaptable in their choice of the means to achieve their goals, their goals themselves
are often evolutionarily given and thus tend to be ﬁxed. For example, men throughout the world and in different historical
periods can achieve higher status by being a skilled hunter, killing many men in neighboring tribes, exploring uncharted ter-
ritories, earning a lot of money, driving the fastest cars, designing the coolest website, or publishing in prestigious academic
journals, but their desire to attain higher status tends to be constant because it is evolutionarily given. Men have everywhere
and always attempted to attain higher status, but adapted their means to achieve it depending upon their speciﬁc
circumstances.
As a general theory of values, evolutionary psychology explains what goals (or values or preferences) humans have. On the
other hand, what does evolutionary psychology have to say about the means they employ to pursue their goals?
2.2. The evolution of general intelligence
General intelligence refers to the ability to reason deductively or inductively, think abstractly, use analogies, synthe-
size information, and apply it to new domains (Gottfredson, 1997; Neisser et al., 1996). The concept of general intelli-
gence poses a problem for evolutionary psychology. Evolutionary psychologists contend that the human brain consists of
domain-speciﬁc evolved psychological mechanisms, which evolved to solve speciﬁc adaptive problems in speciﬁc do-
mains. If the contents of the human brain are domain-speciﬁc, how can evolutionary psychology explain general
intelligence?
In contrast to views expressed by Cosmides and Tooby (2002) and Chiappe and MacDonald (2005), Kanazawa (2004c)
proposes that what is now known as general intelligence may originally have evolved as a domain-speciﬁc adaptation to deal
with evolutionarily novel, nonrecurrent problems. The human brain consists of a large number of domain-speciﬁc evolved
psychological mechanisms to solve recurrent adaptive problems. In this sense, our ancestors did not really have to think in
order to solve such recurrent problems. Evolution has already done all the thinking, so to speak, and equipped the human
brain with the appropriate psychological mechanisms, which engender preferences, desires, cognitions, and emotions,
and motivate adaptive behavior in the context of the ancestral environment.
Even in the extreme continuity and constancy of the ancestral environment, however, there were occasional problems
that were evolutionarily novel and nonrecurrent, which required our ancestors to think and reason in order to solve. To
the extent that these evolutionarily novel, nonrecurrent problems happened frequently enough in the ancestral environment
(different problem each time) and had serious enough consequences for survival and reproduction, then any genetic muta-
tion that allowed its carriers to think and reason would have been selected for, and what we now call ‘‘general intelligence”
could have evolved as a domain-speciﬁc adaptation for the domain of evolutionarily novel, nonrecurrent problems. In this
view, general intelligence may have become universally important in modern life (Gottfredson, 1997; Herrnstein & Murray,
1994; Jensen, 1998) only because our current environment is almost entirely evolutionarily novel.
The new theory suggests, and empirical data conﬁrm, that more intelligent individuals are better than less intelligent
individuals at solving problems only if they are evolutionarily novel but that more intelligent individuals are not better than
less intelligent individuals at solving evolutionarily familiar problems, such as those in the domains of mating, parenting,
interpersonal relationships, and wayﬁnding (Kanazawa, 2007). Three recent studies, employing widely varied methods, have
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ment as well as its annual mean temperature (Ash & Gallup, 2007; Bailey & Geary, 2009; Kanazawa, 2008).
2.3. Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis
The logical conjunction of the Savanna Principle and the theory of the evolution of general intelligence suggests a qual-
iﬁcation of the Savanna Principle. If general intelligence evolved to deal with evolutionarily novel problems, then the human
brain’s difﬁculty in comprehending and dealing with entities and situations that did not exist in the ancestral environment
(proposed in the Savanna Principle) should interact with general intelligence, such that the Savanna Principle holds stronger
among less intelligent individuals than among more intelligent individuals. More intelligent individuals should be better
able to comprehend and deal with evolutionarily novel (but not evolutionarily familiar) entities and situations than less
intelligent individuals.
There has been accumulating evidence for this Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis. First, individuals’ tendency to respond
to TV characters as if they were real friends, ﬁrst discovered by Kanazawa (2002), is limited to those with below-median
intelligence (Kanazawa, 2006a); individuals with above-median intelligence do not become more satisﬁed with their friend-
ships by watching more television.
Second, net of age, race, sex, education, marital status, and religion, less intelligent individuals have more children than
more intelligent individuals, even though they do not want to, possibly because they have greater difﬁculty effectively
employing evolutionarily novel means of modern contraception (Kanazawa, 2005). Another indication that less intelligent
individuals may have greater difﬁculty employing modern contraception effectively is the fact that the correlation between
the lifetime number of sex partners and the number of children is positive among the less intelligent but negative among the
more intelligent. The more sex partners less intelligent individuals have, the more children they have; the more sex partners
more intelligent individuals have, the fewer children they have.
Third, net of education, social class, income, age, sex, race, and marital status, more intelligent individuals stay healthier
and live longer than less intelligent individuals possibly because they are better able to recognize and deal with evolution-
arily novel threats and dangers to health in modern society (Deary, Whiteman, Starr, Whalley, & Fox, 2004; Gottfredson &
Deary, 2004; Kanazawa, 2006b). Consistent with the Hypothesis, however, general intelligence does not affect health and
longevity in sub-Saharan Africa, where many of the health threats and dangers are more evolutionarily familiar than else-
where in the world.
Finally, the application of the Hypothesis to the acquisition and espousal of values shows that, net of age, sex, race, edu-
cation, income, and religion, more intelligent children are more likely to grow up to acquire and espouse evolutionarily novel
values (such as liberalism, atheism, and, for men, sexual exclusivity) as adults than less intelligent individuals (Kanazawa, in
press). Consistent with the Hypothesis, general intelligence does not affect the acquisition and espousal of evolutionarily
familiar values (such as those in marriage, children, family, and friends).
The Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis, and empirical evidence in support of it, suggest that, while goals may be evolu-
tionarily given and more or less constant across individuals, different individuals may employ different means to pursue
their evolutionarily given goals. In particular, more intelligent individuals are more likely to employ evolutionarily novel
means to pursue their goals than less intelligent individuals, but general intelligence does not affect the employment of evo-
lutionarily familiar means. Now what does evolutionary psychology – in particular, the biases and constraints on the human
brain proposed by the Savanna Principle and the Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis – have to say about the topic of social
capital?
3. Social capital from an evolutionary psychological perspective
From an evolutionary psychological perspective, reproductive success, making as many copies of one’s genes as possible,
is the ultimate (albeit largely unconscious) goal of all humans (as it is for all other species), or, more precisely, the goal of
their genes, and all other goals are secondary and subsequent to it (Dawkins, 1989; Kanazawa, 2004a). Even survival is a
means to reproductive success. From this perspective, we are all created and designed to reproduce by evolution by natural
and sexual selection. That is the reason humans exist; that is the reason amebas exist. The fact that many of us do not think
that is the ultimate reason for human existence or that some of us choose not to reproduce is immaterial. We are no more
privy to the evolutionary logic behind our design than amebas are, and, no matter what we choose to do in our own lifetimes,
we are all descended from people who chose to reproduce. None of us inherited our psychological mechanisms from our
ancestors who remained childless.
Whether we like it or not, whether we know it or not, reproductive success is the ultimate goal of all living organisms,
including humans, and everything else is a means toward it. For humans, a K-strategy species,
1 this means that they repro-
duce a small number of children and invest heavily in them so that they will reach the age of sexual maturity and reproduce
1 K-strategy species, such as humans and other great apes, reproduce a few offspring, and care for and invest in them heavily to ensure that most or all of
them will grow to sexual maturity. In contrast, r-strategy species, such as most ﬁsh species, reproduce millions of offspring at a time but do not care for or
invest in them at all (MacArthur & Wilson, 1967).
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they can reproduce themselves, then the parents have managed to leave very few copies of their genome. Parents instead must
make sure that their children themselves have children.
Social capital from an evolutionary psychological perspective is therefore any resource that inheres in relationships between
individuals that, directly or indirectly, helps them attain reproductive success in a given environment. Various aspects of social
relationships (such as trust and associations with others) (Paxton, 1999, pp. 97–104) qualify and count as social capital only
to the extent that they help individuals do so. Social relationships that do not even indirectly or remotely contribute toward
individuals’ reproductive success do not count as social capital.
An evolutionary psychological perspective on social capital suggests a hierarchy of values (Kanazawa, 2001a). It speciﬁes
reproductive success as the ultimate goal, but is otherwise compatible with a variety of proximate goals which help actors
attain reproductive success in their speciﬁc circumstances. For example, to continue our earlier example, an evolutionary
psychological perspective on social capital is compatible with a theory of why men in some societies engage in physical com-
petition to attain status or an entirely different theory of why men in other societies pursue quality university education for
the same purpose. Human behavior in any given circumstances is a function of both their ultimate and proximate goals.
Sometimes the pursuit of proximate goals interferes or even circumvent the pursuit of the ultimate goals, as when people
postpone or altogether forego having children in order to pursue higher education or a demanding career.
The Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis suggests that not all individuals are equally likely to make use of all potential
sources of social capital. In particular, the Hypothesis implies that more intelligent individuals are more likely to employ evo-
lutionarily novel forms of social capital than less intelligent individuals, while general intelligence makes no difference for the
employment of evolutionarily familiar forms of social capital. For example, the Hypothesis suggests the less intelligent men
are relatively more likely to choose (evolutionarily familiar) physical competition as a means to attain status (because they
are less likely to employ other, evolutionarily novel means), while more intelligent individuals are more likely to choose
(evolutionarily novel) university education for the same purpose.
This may be why, for example, less intelligent men are more likely to resort to crime as a means of accumulating re-
sources and attracting mates. Criminologists have long known that criminals on average have lower intelligence than the
general population (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Hirschi & Hindelang, 1977; Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985). Juvenile delinquents
are less intelligent than nondelinquents (Wolfgang, Figlio, & Sellin, 1972; Yeudall, Fromm-Auch, & Davies, 1982), and a sig-
niﬁcant difference in IQ between delinquents and nondelinquents appears as early as ages 8 and 9 (Gibson & West, 1970).
Chronic offenders are less intelligent than one-time offenders (Mofﬁtt, 1990; Wolfgang et al., 1972), and serious offenders
are less intelligent than less serious offenders (Lynam, Mofﬁtt, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1993; Mofﬁtt, Gabrielli, Mednick, &
Schulsinger, 1981). The negative correlation between intelligence and criminality is not an artifact of a selection bias, where-
by less intelligent criminals are more likely to be caught than more intelligent criminals, because the correlation exists even
in self-report studies that do not rely on ofﬁcial police statistics (Mofﬁtt & Silva, 1988).
From the perspective of the Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis, there are two important points to note. First, much of
what we now call interpersonal crime today, such as murder, assault, robbery, and theft, were routine means of intrasexual
competition and resource acquisition and accumulation in the ancestral environment. This is most obvious from the fact that
crime is a cultural universal (Brown, 1991) and that violent and predatory acts that would be classiﬁed as criminal if com-
mitted by humans are quite common among nonhuman species (de Waal, 1989, 1992; de Waal, Luttrell, & Canﬁeld, 1993;
Ellis, 1998; Thornhill & Palmer, 2000). More than likely, our ancestral men competed with each other for resources and mat-
ing opportunities by physical assault, theft, rape, and other means now classiﬁed as criminal. In other words, most forms of
criminal behavior are evolutionarily familiar.
Second, the technology and institutions that deter, control, and punish criminal behavior today – CCTV cameras, the po-
lice, the courts, the prisons, and the DNA ﬁngerprinting – are all evolutionarily novel. There was probably very little formal
third-party enforcement of norms in the ancestral environment; what little third-party enforcement that existed was prob-
ably informal (ostracism by neighbors), not formal (arrest and prosecution) (Boehm, 1999). In other words, the modern crim-
inal justice system is an evolutionarily novel institution to deal with evolutionarily familiar criminal behavior.
The Savanna-IQ Interaction Hypothesis thus suggests that men with lower intelligence may be more prone to resorting to
evolutionarily familiar means of competition and resource acquisition than to evolutionarily novel means toward the same
ends (theft rather than full-time employment in a capitalist economy; forcible rape rather than computer dating). It also
makes sense from this perspective that men with lower intelligence may fail fully to comprehend the consequences of their
criminal behavior imposed by evolutionarily novel entities of law enforcement and criminal justice system. Hence the
Hypothesis can explain why less intelligent men are more likely to engage in criminal behavior than more intelligent men.
An important implication of an evolutionary psychological perspective on social capital is that what counts as social capital
may often be different for men and women. In the ancestral environment, where our ancestors were hunter-gatherers, there
was a clear division of labor between the sexes. It was the male who attained status through game hunting and competition,
while the female took physical care of the children. Ancestral men of higher status were better able to protect and provide for
their children than men of lower status, and their children had greater chances of survival to sexual maturity. There is evi-
dence to suggest that, for this reason, women to this day are attracted to men of higher status in all societies (Buss, 1989;
Kanazawa, 2003).
Recall that evolved psychological mechanisms, such as the one that produces criteria by which women judge their poten-
tial mates, are adapted to the conditions of the ancestral environment, not to the current environment. The Savanna Principle
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psychological mechanisms and the desires and preferences they engender, just as the fact that snakes and spiders present us
with little danger today has not altered our phobias for them. At the same time, however, the Savanna-IQ Interaction
Hypothesis suggests that more intelligent men and women are better able to overcome such evolutionary constraints and
resort to evolutionarily novel forms of social capital in order to increase their reproductive success. We therefore expect less
intelligent men and women to adhere to the evolutionarily familiar division of labor while more intelligent men and women
resort to evolutionarily novel means toward reproductive success.
We have elsewhere proposed that there are sex differences in human sociality (Savage & Kanazawa, 2004) and that men
and women experience differential pleasure and anxiety in certain social relations due to the beneﬁts these responses would
have had in the ancestral environment. For instance, we would expect women to experience greater anxiety leaving a baby
behind, or at the sound of its cry, than men would. In the current environment, however, it is sometimes in the best interest
of the children for the mothers to leave the home for gainful employment. In the ancestral environment, it would have en-
hanced reproductive success for women to feel profound anxiety when leaving their children behind; the same anxiety when
dropping off a child at the day care center works against the women’s reproductive success today. The Savanna-IQ Interac-
tion Hypothesis predicts that it is precisely the more intelligent women who are better able to overcome such evolutionarily
familiar anxiety, leave their children in day care, and pursue a career as an evolutionarily novel means to achieve reproduc-
tive success.
How does an evolutionary psychological perspective contribute to economics and economic psychology in general? Eco-
nomic theories are based on the model of the singular and unitary actor (Kanazawa, 2006c) and refer to ‘‘a generic ‘‘person
one/person two” household or ‘‘parent-child” family, rather than their anatomically correct counterparts: sons and daugh-
ters, fathers and mothers, and grandfathers and grandmothers” (Cox, 2007, p. 91). For example, throughout his treatise on
happiness, Layard (2005) investigates what makes individuals or people happy and devotes very little attention to what may
make men or women happy. In a study of the endowment effect motivated by evolutionary (as opposed to evolutionary
psychological) theory, Huck, Kirchsteiger, and Oechssler (2005) specify only two types of actors: ‘‘those who have an endow-
ment of x only, the ‘x-owners,’ and those with an endowment of y, the ‘y-owners’” (p. 694), without regard to sex.
The model of the sexless singular and unitary actor in microeconomics often leads to spectacular errors in prediction. In
January 1998, the supermarket chain Safeway started implementing the ‘‘superior customer service policy,” which required
all Safeway employees (male and female) to look customers (male and female) in the eye and smile (Liedtke, 2000; Pate,
2001; Ream, 2000). If the customer paid by check or credit card, cashiers were required quickly to scan the customer’s last
name and thank them by name, as in ‘‘Thank you, Mr. so-and-so, for shopping at Safeway,” while looking them in the eye and
smiling.
This policy, based on the model of the sexless singular and unitary actor, worked very well roughly three-quarters of the
time, between a male employee and a male customer, between a male employee and a female customer, and between a fe-
male employee and a female customer. However, the policy backﬁred when the employee was female and the customer was
male. When the female employee gazed deeply into his eyes, smiled, and thanked him by his name, the male customer nat-
urally assumed that she was attracted to him, and started harassing her by following her around on and off work. Eventually,
ﬁve female employees had to ﬁle a Federal sex discrimination charge against Safeway to force it to stop this policy, which the
supermarket chain did when it reached an out-of-court settlement (Kanazawa, 2006c, pp. 98–99).
As it turns out, the Safeway ﬁasco could easily have been predicted by an evolutionary psychological model called the
error management theory (Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006). It explains why men are evolutionarily designed
to overinfer sexual interest on women’s part from ambiguous cues. An evolutionary psychological perspective, which makes
a clear distinction between men and women rather than employing the model of singular and unitary actor, can improve the
predictions of economic models and prevent the recurrence of the Safeway ﬁasco.
4. An illustration: why do women have more kin in their personal networks than men do? And why are we closer to
our maternal grandmother than to our paternal grandfather?
Empirical studies on personal networks repeatedly demonstrate that otherwise comparable men and women have similar
personal networks. The only exception to this rule is that women have more kin and fewer coworkers in their personal net-
works than men do (Campbell, 1988; Fischer & Oliker, 1983; Marsden, 1987). While there appears little doubt that this sex
difference in personal networks exists, few network theorists seem to know why.
An evolutionary psychological perspective on social capital suggests an answer to this question, as a possible function of
sex differences in the need for kin in order to achieve reproductive success. The fact that the female gamete (egg) is greater in
size and fewer in number than the male gamete (sperm) (which is the biological deﬁnition of the sexes), and the fact that
gestation takes place within the female body, together lead, directly or indirectly, to almost all of the sex differences in pref-
erences and behavior. One of these differences is parental investment. Across all species for which these two conditions hold,
the female makes greater parental investment than the male (Trivers, 1972). In fact, for most species, the male parental
investment is limited to the sperm deposited inside the female body during copulation. The sex differences in parental
investment occurs because males under these conditions have much higher ﬁtness ceiling than the females do; males can
potentially produce a far larger number of offspring in their lifetimes than females can.
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more valuable to a mother than to a father because it represents a greater share of the mother’s lifetime reproductive po-
tential than the father’s. Men are exceptional in nature in that they make a large amount of parental investment in their off-
spring (compared to males of other species). Nonetheless, women (just like females of most other species) usually make
greater parental investment in their children than men do, because women’s evolved psychological mechanisms incline
them to do so.
However, women cannot always do it alone; sometimes, they need help from others, especially in the ancestral environ-
ment where resources were scarce and life was precarious. When mothers need help in their effort to raise their children,
nobody is more likely or willing to deliver it than their kin. Women’s kin are sometimes even more motivated to invest
in the children, materially or otherwise, than the putative fathers are, because, due to paternity uncertainty (created by
the possibility of cuckoldry), the fathers may or may not be genetically related to the children, whereas the maternal kin
are guaranteed to be genetically related to the children.
2 For the same reason, paternal kin are not as motivated to invest
in the children as maternal kin are. We suggest that this may be why women, even today, have a larger number of kin in their
personal networks than men do.
Consistent with this explanation, Kanazawa (2001b) reports that, net of employment status, occupational prestige, race,
and parenthood, family income has a signiﬁcantly negative effect on the kin density (the proportion of personal network ties
that are kin) among women, while it has no effect on men’s kin density. One possible interpretation is that women with more
resources may need less help from their kin in raising their children than women with fewer resource. Similarly, net of the
same control variables, being currently married has a signiﬁcantly negative effect on women’s kin density, but not on men’s.
This may be because married women can rely on their husbands in raising their children, while currently unmarried women
don’t have this option and sometimes have to resort to their kin in order to get help.
From our perspective, women may have more kin in their personal networks because such networks count as social cap-
ital for them. Women’s close ties with their kin may help them better raise their children. Women’s kin may be (uncon-
sciously) motivated to help invest in the children because they are certain to be genetically related to them. In contrast,
close ties with kin may not count as social capital for men because they do not help them attain reproductive success. Men’s
kin may be (unconsciously) less motivated to invest in the children because they cannot be certain that they are genetically
related to them. Further, our perspective on social capital can simultaneously explain why men are more likely to have
coworkers in their personal networks because their ties to coworkers often help them attain higher status in the workplace,
and hence (indirectly) greater reproductive success. Men have evolved preferences for all-male relationships which would
have constituted valuable social capital in the ancestral environment because of the need for male–male coalitions in coop-
erative hunting, politics, and warfare (Tiger, 1969).
If women have more kin in their personal networks than men do, it logically follows that, among the children’s genera-
tion, individuals (both men and women) have more maternal kin than paternal kin in their personal networks. This makes
theoretical sense from an evolutionary psychological perspective, because, once again, individuals are certain to be geneti-
cally related to their maternal kin whereas, due to paternity uncertainty, they may or may not be genetically related to their
paternal kin. From our perspective, maternal kin are better sources of social capital than paternal kin.
There is evidence to suggest that individuals are closer to and have more contact with maternal kin than paternal kin.
Salmon (1999) shows that, among undergraduate students at McMaster University in Canada, not only do women visit
and phone their relatives signiﬁcantly more frequently than men do, but both men and women visit and phone their mater-
nal grandparents and maternal uncles and aunts more frequently than paternal grandparents and paternal uncles and aunts.
This is despite the fact that they live much closer to paternal grandparents and paternal uncles and aunts than to maternal
grandparents and maternal uncles and aunts. Relationships between and among maternal relatives appear much tighter and
closer despite their greater physical distances.
If paternity uncertainty is a problem for the father, it’s an even greater problem for the paternal grandfather (Cox, 2007).
Paternal grandfathers have two reasons why they may not be related to their grandchildren (they may have been cuckolded
by their wives, or their sons may have been cuckolded by their wives). In sharp contrast, maternal grandmothers are guar-
anteed to be related to their grandchildren. Paternal grandmothers and maternal grandfathers fall in between these two ex-
tremes; both categories of grandparents each have one reason why they may not be related to their grandchildren. It
therefore follows from evolutionary psychological logic that maternal grandmothers have more contact with and invest
more heavily in their grandchildren than either paternal grandmothers or maternal grandfathers, who in turn have more
contact with and invest more heavily in their grandchildren than paternal grandfathers.
There is a large amount of evidence to conﬁrm this hypothesis. DeKay (1995) shows that undergraduate students at the
University of Michigan are emotionally closer to, spend more time with, and receive more resources from maternal grand-
mothers than either paternal grandmothers or maternal grandfathers, and they are in turn closer to, spend more time with,
2 More precisely, whether the putative father or the maternal kin are more motivated to invest in the children crucially hinges on the average level of
paternity uncertainty (the possibility of cuckoldry). The biological father shares 50% of his genes with the child (coefﬁcient of relatedness r = .50) whereas
maternal grandparents and maternal uncles and aunts share 25% of their genes with it (r = .25). It means that, as long as paternity uncertainty is less than .50
(the probability of cuckoldry p < .50), then the biological father is still more closely related to the child on average than the maternal kin. It is only when p > .50
that maternal kin are on average more closely related to the child and thus more motivated to invest in it than the putative father. In some tribal societies
where paternity uncertainty is consistently high, it is the maternal uncle, not the putative father, who is expected to invest in the child.
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Weitzel (1996) ﬁnd exactly the same pattern in their study of German respondents, and Pashos (2000) in his comparative
study of Germans and Greeks. In a study of bereaved parents, Littleﬁeld and Rushton (1986) ﬁnd that, not only do mothers
grieve the death of their children more than do fathers, but maternal grandmothers grieve the death of their grandchildren
more than either paternal grandmothers or maternal grandfathers, who in turn grieve more than paternal grandfathers. We
are not aware of any theoretical perspective besides evolutionary psychology which can explain the precise ordering: mater-
nal grandmother > paternal grandmother = maternal grandfather > paternal grandfather.
More recently, however, Laham, Gonsalkorale, and von Hippel (2005) suggest that evolutionary logic predicts that
maternal grandfathers should invest more in their grandchildren than paternal grandmothers (in other words,
maternal grandmother > maternal grandfather > paternal grandmother > paternal grandfather, instead of maternal grand-
mother > paternal grandmother = maternal grandfather > paternal grandfather). This is because paternal grandmothers often
have other grandchildren (their daughters’ children) to invest in where there is no possibility of cuckoldry anywhere. In
other words, paternal grandmothers often have the opportunity to invest in other grandchildren as maternal grandmothers,
whereas maternal grandfathers have no such opportunity. Consistent with this logic, Laham et al. (2005) ﬁnd that individuals
feel closer to maternal grandfathers than to paternal grandmothers only when paternal grandmothers have other grandchil-
dren through their daughters. In his analysis of the National Survey of Families and Households, Cox (2008) ﬁnds that pater-
nal grandmothers are more willing to provide childcare for their grandchildren if their daughters-in-law are more
committed to their marriage to their sons, which presumably reﬂects the probability of their sons’ cuckoldry.
Now what do these ﬁndings mean for social capital? There are of course other important factors besides certainty of ge-
netic relatedness in evaluating the sources of social capital, so, for example, a wealthy paternal grandfather will be a more
important source of material resources than a destitute maternal grandmother. However, all else equal, an evolutionary psy-
chological perspective suggests that a close relationship with a maternal grandmother will constitute a more important
source of social capital than a similarly close relationship with other types of grandparents, because a maternal grandmother
will be more willing to invest in a grandchild than other grandparents.
Given that most parents have both sons and daughters, grandparents have a choice of maternal grandchildren (children of
their daughters) and paternal grandchildren (children of their sons). Given this choice, an evolutionary psychological per-
spective suggests (and available studies conﬁrm) that they are more likely to invest in maternal grandchildren than paternal
grandchildren. A given amount of resources is expected to increase their reproductive success (inclusive ﬁtness) further if
invested in maternal grandchildren than in paternal grandchildren.
Patterns of kin relationships and personal networks consistent with an evolutionary psychological perspective on social
capital appear even in studies of women only. For example, Essock-Vitale and McGuire (1985) show that women are much
more likely to give and receive help from their parents, full siblings and children (with whom they share 50% of their genes:
r = .50) than from their half siblings, grandparents, uncles, aunts, and grandchildren (with whom they share 25% of their
genes: r = .25), and they are in turn more likely to give and receive help from the latter categories of relatives than from their
more distant ones (cousins: r < .25).
Hamilton’s law (Hamilton, 1964) states that any beneﬁt conferred to genetic kin must be discounted by the coefﬁcient of
relatedness between the benefactor and the recipient. A given sum of money is worth twice as much to the benefactor’s gen-
ome if offered to a sister (r = .50) as it is if offered to a niece (r = .25). From the perspective of the recipient, it means that, all
else (such as the wealth of a potential benefactor) equal, a close tie to a sister is twice as important a source of social capital
as a close tie to an aunt, because she is twice as likely to receive resources (material or otherwise) which help her reproduc-
tive success from a sister as from an aunt. And both categories of relatives are far more important sources of social capital
than cousins or unrelated friends.
In sum, studies of men’s and women’s relationships with kin are consistent with an evolutionary psychological perspec-
tive on social capital. Women have more kin in their personal networks than men do (Campbell, 1988; Fischer & Oliker,
1983; Marsden, 1987), and they have an even greater density of kin in their networks when they have fewer alternative
means of support for raising children (Kanazawa, 2001b). Women are more likely to receive help from or give help to closer
relatives than more distant ones (Essock-Vitale & McGuire, 1985). We are closer to our maternal kin than to our paternal kin
even when greater geographical distances separate us (Salmon, 1999). We are closer to maternal grandmother than to our
paternal grandmother or maternal grandfather, and we are in turn closer to the latter than to our paternal grandfather
(DeKay, 1995; Euler & Weitzel, 1996; Littleﬁeld & Rushton, 1986; Pashos, 2000). We are closer to our maternal grandfather
than to our paternal grandmother but only when the latter has alternative grandchildren in whom to invest (Laham et al.,
2005). We suggest that it would be very difﬁcult to ﬁnd any other general theoretical perspective on social capital besides
evolutionary psychology that can simultaneously account for all these facets of our relationships to kin.
5. Conclusion
We understand the appeal of focusing on the construct of social capital in order to understand social life. But because
social capital inheres in relationships it is important to understand individual motivations for establishing and maintaining
relationships in the ﬁrst place. We therefore believe that an overemphasis on narrow empirical questions like ‘‘Does social
capital reduce the odds of school drop out?” is largely misguided. The recent lament that social capital is in decline (Putnam,
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to see that there are fewer and fewer nuclear families and that social institutions that we fondly recall from our youth (the
welcome wagons, Boy Scouts, and bowling leagues) are on the wane. If we take a longer view of history, however, we soon
realize that such institutions were only common for a relatively short period in our history. In earlier years, families were
often torn apart – mothers died in child birth, children died from accidents and diseases, wars killed many young men.
Boy Scouts and bowling leagues had not been invented. Throughout human evolutionary history, the nuclear family has been
the exception, not the norm. The nature of social ties varies a great deal across space and time, and the reliance on any nar-
rowly focused measures of ‘‘social capital” or positive life outcomes (such as school attendance) is likely to result in incon-
sistent empirical ﬁndings.
In this paper we advance an evolutionary psychological perspective on social capital. We reiterate and emphasize our
point that evolutionary psychology is but one perspective on social capital. It has the advantage of offering a clear deﬁnition
of what social capital is from metatheoretical ﬁrst principles, which few other perspectives can. However, we encourage oth-
ers to propose their own theories and clear deﬁnitions of social capital, and subject competing hypotheses (including ours) to
rigorous empirical tests.
Apart from its ability to suggest a solution to an empirical puzzle of why women have more kin in their social networks,
we believe an evolutionary psychological perspective on social capital has several distinct advantages: what, why, when,
where, and how. First, an evolutionary psychological deﬁnition of social capital can ﬁnally tell us exactly what social capital
is. While there has been a great deal of discussion of the concept, there currently appears to be no clear consensus as to what
social capital is. This may be because one needs a theory of values in order to deﬁne capital (social or otherwise), and there
presently is no widely accepted theory of values that explains what humans want.
Second, an evolutionary psychological perspective, which is one of the current contenders for a general theory of values,
can tell us why social capital is important, and, in a more general sense, why humans are social. While everyone recognizes
that humans are social, they may not necessarily know why. From an evolutionary psychological perspective, humans (and
members of many other species) are social because their sociality promotes reproductive success. Human sociality is largely
how our ancestors survived long enough to reproduce and raise their offspring. That is why humans are social and that is
why social capital is important for humans.
Third, an evolutionary psychological perspective can tell us when and where we expect humans to maintain their social
ties. While the perspective explains why humans are social, it does not predict them to be universally and indiscriminately
social. Humans are social and maintain their social ties with others only when and where such ties help them attain repro-
ductive success. They join bowling leagues and other local groups, if doing so ultimately promotes their reproductive suc-
cess, but not if otherwise. Few other theoretical perspective can explain why most of us maintain closer ties to our
maternal grandmothers than to paternal grandfathers, when the latter live closer to us than the former.
Finally, an evolutionary psychological perspective on social capital, with its clear deﬁnition of the concept, can tell us pre-
cisely how to measure it at different times and in different places. It would strongly argue against using the same measure
across time and places, because which relationships promote reproductive success can vary across time and places. An evo-
lutionary psychological perspective suggests that we count as social capital only those relationships that, directly or indi-
rectly, promote individuals’ reproductive success.
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